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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
property without due process of law.3 6 One difficulty, not present
in condemnation proceedings, which has prevented a clear test
of the taxing power is that there is ordinarily not sufficient in-
terest to give the individual standing in the courts and a right
to contest the legislation.Y But the dispute over the extent of the
national power to tax is based on two fundamental theories; one,
that Congress may levy to provide for the general welfare in the
broadest sense, and two, that it can tax only in connection with
and to enable it to carry out the powers specifically granted by
the Constitution.8 And the same two opinions exist in the field
of eminent domain. Taking is proper, on the one hand, where it
is for the welfare, good, or benefit of the people ;39 or it is im-
proper unless necessary to the execution of granted powers.40
The authoritative adoption of one of these conflicting theories
would aid the settlement of a situation which is none too clear.
T. S. MCPHEETERS. JR. '36.
THE JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN COMPENSATED AND ACCOMMODATION
SURETIES IN MISSOURI
The term "surety" as used before the latter part of the nine-
teenth century indicated the private accommodation surety who
assumed legal obligations from motives of friendliness and not
pecuniary gain, by becoming a party to a contract prepared and
drawn by another., The contract of suretyship antedated the
Christian era by more than 2500 years; as a consequence, the
rules of suretyship were formulated during the earlier and more
plastic period of legal development. 2 In view of the gratuitous
nature of the undertaking of the private accommodation surety,
and the severity of the penalty imposed upon him in case of the
36 Loan Association v. Topeka (1874) 20 Wall. 655; Cole v. La Grange
(1884) 113 U. S. 1. When the highest court of a state has declared a tax
was for a public purpose its decision has never been reversed, though
power to do so has not been disclaimed. See Hairston v. Danville &
Western Ry. (1908) 208 U. S. 598.
37 Cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 447.
38 Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 548.
The case of Washington Water Power Co. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, supra
note 33, takes the contrary view, holding that because of the Xth Amend-
ment Congress can appropriate only in the exercise of its enumerated
powers.
39 See the quotations from Mr. Justice Holmes, supra notes 30 and 31.
40 Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., supra note 5; U. S. v.
Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., supra note 6.
1 See Arnold, The Compensated Surety, 26 Col. If. Rev. 171 (1926).2 Lloyd, The Surety, (1917) 66 U. Pa. L. Rev. 40; Morgan, The History
and Economics of Suretyship, (1927) 12 Cornell L. Quart., 153, 487; Brandt,
Suretyship and Guaranty, (3rd. ed. 1905) 17.
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principal debtor's default, it was to be expected that the courts
would be reluctant to declare a forfeiture of the property of the
surety. As a result, a logical basis may be found for the rule of
strictissimi juris, which has been expanded until today it is some-
times applied regardless of the equities of the parties in the par-
ticular case.3
With the advent of the corporate surety, the law of suretyship
in late years has undergone a considerable change. The corporate
surety being of comparatively recent origin, it is not surprising
that the development of this new type has caused resultant diffi-
culties, and that distinctions have been made between this com-
pensated surety and its predecessor, the accommodation surety.
It would necessarily follow that an application of different prin-
ciples is required when the surety is one who, for compensation
and as a regular business, contracts to become responsible for the
obligations of others, than where we are concerned with a gratui-
tous surety. The limits of this difference in treatment have not
yet been completely and clearly defined by the Missouri courts,
but it is quite evident from the cases that at least insofar as the
rule of strictissimi juris produces results peculiar to the contract
of the accommodation surety in contrast with ordinary contracts
in general, that rule is not invoked to favor the compensated
surety. In distinguishing the two types of sureties, the courts of
Missouri have expressed themselves in varying language. Some
times the statem-nt is merely that the corporate compensated
surety is not entitled to the benefit of the rule strictissimi juris."
3 Stearns, Suretyship, (3rd. ed. 1922) 59, 60.
4 Kansas City, to Use of Ingalls Stone Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., (1925) 219 Mo. App. 283, 269 S. W. 693 (suit on surety's covenant in
contract guaranteeing payment of labor and materials furnished in con-
structing park improvements where the court merely said, "Of course, the
surety being a compensated surety, the rule of strictissimi juris does not
apply.") ; State, ex rel. Concrete and Steel Const. Co. v. Southern Surety
Co., (1927) 221 Mo. App. 67, 294 S. W. 123 (The question was whether the
subletting of a contract for the tearing down of an old bridge without the
written consent of the commission and engineers was such an alteration of
the contract as to discharge the surety. "The law is well settled that, in
construing the contract of a surety for hire, as in this case, the rule of
strictissimi juris is greatly relaxed, and the rule that sureties are the
favorites of the law does not apply."). In the case of State, ex rel. Brennan
v. Dierker, (1903) 101 Mo. App. 636, 74 S. W. 153, 156, a sheriff's bonds-
men were held not liable on the sheriff's bond. Brennan, the injured party,
was arrested by the sheriff without a warrant, for a misdemeanor not com-
mitted in his presence. In the opinion by Goode, J., "so far as Dierker is
concerned, the case is clear. But his bondsmen must be considered, and
their rights are of prime importance in legal contemplation." But in the
case of State, ex rel. and to Use of Kaecher v. Roth, (Mo. 1932) 49 S. W.(2d.) 109, a deputy constable, in pursuit of a driver of a car who had com-
mitted a misdemeanor, fired at the fleeting car and struck a passenger
therein. The constable and the surety were held liable. In the words of
the court, "The only basis we can find for the doctrine announced in the
opinion in the above case (Brennan v. Dierker) and kindred cases is, as
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At other times, the court states that the contract is to be con-
strued strictly against the compensated surety, or liberally in
favor of the promisee.5 The rule for construction, in the latter
instance, is the one applied to the interpretation of other instru-
ments. The court will resort to the same aids and invoke the
same canons of construction which apply to other contracts, the
intention of the parties constituting the main issue.0 Accord-
ingly, when there is room for construction of language, or more
than one possible effect of language used in the suretyship con-
tract, the benefits from any such construction inure to the prom-
isee rather than the promisor.7 Elsewhere, it has been said that
the learned Judge Goode said: "* * the overweening tenderness of the law
for sureties." This tenderness of the law for sureties had its origin when
the courts were called upon to decide the liability of gratuitous sureties on
bonds. However, this so called tenderness for sureties has no place in the
law in cases of sureties for hire. These sureties receive compensation, and
for a valuable consideration bind themselves and guarantee that, in cases
of sheriffs or constables, the officers will not abuse the power with which
they have been vested. The sureties should be held to their contract."
5 See Noonan v. Indep. Co., (1931) 328 Mo. 706, 41 S. W. (2d.) 162.
6 Though a surety has the right to limit his liability to the very terms
of his undertaking, nevertheless a bond is so construed, as any other con-
tract, with regard to the intention of the parties, and its purpose as dis-
closed by the instrument, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.
Evans v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., (1917) 195 Mo. App. 438, 192
S. W. 112; School Dist. v. McClure, (Mo. 1920) 224 S. W. 831; Board of
Education of St. Louis v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., (1911) 155 Mo.
App. 109, 134 S. W. 18 (The obligation of a surety on a contractor's bond
was held to be measured by the contract for the work and the bond, read
together; the suretyship contract being given a reasonable interpretation
according to the intention of the parties as disclosed by the contract read in
the light of the surrounding circumstances, and the purpose for which it
was made); Kansas City v. Davidson, (1911) 154 Mo. App. 269, 133 S. W.
365; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., (1921) 291
Mo. 98, 236 S. W. 657 (bond of indemnity to the railway company against
loss in the purchase of ties from the principal contractor. It was held that
the general rule that sureties were favorites of the law, and that their
contracts should be construed most strongly in their favor, did not apply
where a surety was a corporation organized and empowered to act as such
for a price, and the contracts of such compensated sureties were to be con-
strued in accordance with the reasonable intent of the parties as plainly
indicated by their terms.)
7 If the bond of the compensated surety be reasonably susceptible of an
interpretation favorable to the beneficiary, and of another favorable to the
compensated surety, the former, if consistent with the objects for which the
bond was given, will be adopted. Long Bro's. Grocery Co. v. U. S. Fidelity
and Guaranty Co., (1908) 130 Mo. App. 421, 110 S. W. 29; Hurley v.
Fidelity and Deposit Co., (1902) 95 Mo. App. 88, 68 S. W. 958; Dorr v.
Bankers' Surety Co., (Mo. 1920) 218 S. W. 398; State, to Use of Hubbard
and Moffitt Comm. Co. v. Cochrane, (1915) 264 Mo. 581, 175 S. W. 602(where the bond of the compensated surety was held enforceable as a valid
common law obligation aside from stipulations to comply with the inspection
laws); Lackland v. Renshaw, (1914) 256 Mo. 133, 165 S. W. 314; Union
State Bank v. American Surety Co., (Mo. 1929) 23 S. W. (2d.) 1038 (any
ambiguity of a written contract of a compensated surety is to be construed
most strongly against the surety).
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the contract of the compensated surety is to be construed as are
contracts of insurance.8 A survey of the subject shows that a
majority of the cases contain statements that the promisor is not
so much a surety as an insurer and that the rules of insurance
apply.' The surety, it is said, is an insurer of the debt, the fidel-
ity, or the undertaking of his principal, and when he engages in
the business of furnishing surety for hire, his obligation is no
longer construed under the rule of strictissimi juris but is sub-
ject to the rules of construction applicable to insurance policies
generally.10 So that, speaking generally, the contracts of surety-
9 Roark v. City Trust and Surety Co., (1908) 130 Mo. App. 401, 110
S. W. 1 (a contract of suretyship against loss by dishonesty of an em-
ployee is, in effect, a contract of insurance, and must be construed as an
insurance policy); State, ex rel. Matter v. Ogden, (1915) 187 Mo. App. 39,
172 S. W. 1172 (surety company bond of a notary public; the rights of the
ordinary surety being considered strictissimi juris, while the contracts of
the compensated sureties being construed as contracts of insurance); Bop-
part v. Illinois Surety Co., (1909) 140 Mo. App. 683, 126 S. W. 768; Fair-
banks Canning Co. v. London Guaranty and Accident Co., (1911) 154 Mo.
App. 327, 133 S. W. 664; Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. John Gill and Sons
Co., (Mo. 1924) 270 S. W. 700 (surety on contractor's bond was said to be
in reality an insurer and the contract was to be construed most strongly
in favor of the obligee); Rule v. Anderson, (1911) 160 Mo. App. 347, 142
S. W. 358; St. Louis Ass'n. v. American Bonding Co., (1917) 197 Mo. App.
430, 196 S. W. 1148 (indemnity bond securing the faithful performance of
a secretary of the association. A corporation engaged in the business of
acting a ssurety for hire in respect to its obligation to indemnify the em-
ployer for any loss sustained by reason of dishonesty of the employee, was
said to be virtually in the position of an insurer); Burton Mchg. Co. v.
National Surety Co., (Mo. 1916) 182 S. W. 801; Schnitzer v. Couch, (Mo.
1925) 279 S. W. 165 (contract of suretyship for erecting of a building;
the surety being declared to be an insurer); State, ex. rel. Elberta Peach
and Land Co. v. Chicago Bonding and Surety Co., (1919) 279 Mo. 535, 215
S. W. 20; the failure of the owner to reserve a percentage of the contract
price as stipulated in the building contract, would operate to release an
accommodation surety under the rule that any change in the contract with-
out his consent releases the surety. This rule was rejected, however, when
it was sought to have it applied to the case of a surety for hire whose posi-
tion was said to be that of an insurer. Barton v. Title Guaranty and
Surety Co., (1916) 192 Mo. App. 561, 183 S. W. 694; Krey Packing Co. v.
U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., (1915) 189 Mo. App. 591, 175 S. W. 322
(indemnity bond of traveling salesman).
9 See footnote 8, supra.
10 Note, for example, the following language in State, ex. rel. Elberta
Peach and Land Co. v. Chicago Bonding and Surety Co., supra footnote 8,
where the court expresses itself thus: "The domain of insurance law is no
longer limited to the interpretation and enforcement of fire, life, and
marine insurance contracts. In recent years a multitude of other forms of
insurance have obtained, covering almost every conceivable risk incident to
modern business and industrial life. Concurrently with the extension of the
insurance business, there has been a corresponding development of insur-
ance law, through the application to the new and varied forms of insur-
ance contracts of the fundamental rules and principles governing the older
ones. By this means there has come into existence, with many others, a
branch of the insurance law known as guaranty insurance, which embraces
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss2/9
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ship issued by the surety companies, organized for the purpose
of furnishing surety for hire, are contracts of insurance.1"
On the other hand, the accommodation surety is, and has been
in the past, a favorite of the law, and his contract is strictissimi
juris.12 The contract of the accommodation surety will be strictly
construed and all doubts and technicalities resolved in favor of
the surety. This rule has been applied in order to determine the
meaning of the language used and the operative effect of that
fidelity, commercial, and judicial insurances. Of these commercial, or in-
demnity, insurance and judicial insurance, so called, are of the more recent
origin. In the bonds or policies of guaranty insurance, the more natural
attitude of a surety is assumed; but they are contracts of insurance none
the less .... In current decisions dealing with such contracts, the courts
continually refer to them indifferently as "bonds," "indemnity contracts,"
"insurance bonds," "insurance contracts," and "guarantee policies." Fidelity
and Deposit Co. v. John Gill and Sons Co., (Mo. 1924) 270 S. W. 700.11 See footnote 8, supra.
22Stearns, Suretyship, (4th. ed.) 401; Lange Co. v. Freeman, (Mo. 1929)
13 S. W. (2d.) 1092 (voluntary surety is entitled to a favorable strict con-
struction of the contract); the contract of a surety must receive a strict
interpretation and cannot be extended beyond the fair scope of its terms.
Blair v. Perpetual Ins. Co., (1847) 10 Mo. 559, 47 Am. Dec. 129; State, ex
rel. Bell v. Yates, (1910) 231 Mo. 276, 132 S. W. 672; Same v. Grant,
(1910) 231 Mo. 292, 132 S. W. 676; Beers v. Strimple, (1893) 116 Mo. 179,
22 S. W. 620; Evans v. Graden, (1894) 125 Mo. 72, 28 S. W. 439 (the lia-
bility of a surety was said to be measured by the strict terms of his con-
tract, and could not be extended by construction or implication); Bank of
Moberly v. Meals, (1927) 316 Mo. 1158, 295 S. W. 73 (liability of sureties
consenting to be bound to a certain extent only must be found within the
terms of that consent, strictly construed); Springfield Lighting Co. v.
Hobart, (1903) 98 Mo. App. 227, 68 S. W. 942; Fisse v. Einstein, (1878)
5 Mo. App. 78; State, ex rel. Blair v. Pittman, (1908) 131 Mo. App. 299,
111 S. W. 134 (the relation between the creditor and the security debtor is
comprised within the strict letter of the contract, and the obligation of the
latter should not be extended by any liberal intendment beyond the under-
taking) ; Harris v. Taylor, (1910) 150 Mo. App. 291, 129 S. W. 995; Moore
v. Title Guaranty and Trust Co., (1910) 151 Mo. App. 256, 131 S. W. 477;
Killoren v. Meehan, (1893) 55 Mo. App. 427 (a surety has the right to
stand on the strict terms of his contract, and if a variation is made without
his consent, he is discharged; and the principle applies to building contracts
the same as to other contracts) ; State, ex rel. Moore v. Sandusky, (1870)
46 Mo. 377; Utterson v. Elmore, (1911) 154 Mo. App. 646, 136 S. W. 9(any change in a building contract without the surety's consent discharges
the surety, regardless of whether the changes injure him) ; Leavel v. Porter,(1893) 52 Mo. App. 632; Stulz v. Lentin, (1927) 221 Mo. App. 840, 295
S. W. 487 (sureties must be given benefit of strictissimi juris) ; Erath v.
Allen, (1893) 55 Mo. App. 450; State, ex rel. School Dist. v. Weeks, (1902)
92 Mo. App. 359; Matthews v. Hill, (Mo. 1926) 287 S. W. 789; Citizens'
Trust Co. v. Tindle, (1917) 272 Mo. 681, 199 S. W. 1025 (sureties are the
favorites of the law and the doctrine of strictissimi juris is to be invoked
in construing the contracts); Taylor v. Jeter, (1856) 23 Mo. 244; Gray v.
Davis, (1901) 89 Mo. App. 450; Higgins v. Deering Harvester Co., 181 Mo.
300, 79 S. W. 959; Swasey v. Doyle, (1901) 88 Mo. App. 536; Mallory v.
Brent, (1898) 75 Mo. App. 473; Hendley v. Barrows, (1897) 68 Mo. App.
623; Chapman v. Ry. Co., (1893) 114 Mo. 543, 21 S. W. 858; London v.
Funsch, (1915) 189 Mo. App. 14, 173 S. W. 88.
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language as ascertained.13 It is equally well settled that the rule
of strictissimi juris does not apply to contracts of the compen-
sated surety and that it is not a favorite of the law ;14 the favor-
able considerations accorded the gratuitous surety being denied
'a Obligations reduced to writing are to be construed according to their
obvious meaning, and obligators, especially where mere sureties, are not
to be held bound by any forced construction. Cochrane v. Stewart, (1876)
63 Mo. 424; London v. Funsch, (1915) 188 Mo. App. 14, 173 S. W. 88
(where a surety was held entitled to a strict performance of the principal
contract); Saginaw Medicine Co. v. Dykes, (1922) 210 Mo. App. 399, 238
S. W. 556 (in determining the liability of sureties, the rule of strictissimi
juris applies, and they cannot be held beyond the letter of their obligation) ;
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Nevils, (1925) 217 Mo. App. 630, 274 S. W.
503 (a strained construction of the contract should not be resorted to to
release or hold sureties for they are not bound beyond the letter of their
obligation).
14 Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. John Gill and Sons Co., (Mo. 1924) 270
S. W. 700 (surety on bond of contractor constructing state capitol; rule of
strictissimi juris not applicable and there is no presumption of loss or
pre udice in favor of the compensated surety); State, to Use of Hubbard
an Moffitt Comm. Co. v. Cochrane, (1915) 264 Mo. 581, 175 S. W. 599
(surety on bond of warehouseman to enable the principal to secure a license
to conduct a public grain elevator was held to indemnify the public as to
the common law obligation of the warehouseman as well as the statutory
obligation; the surety being denied a strict construction of the contract in
its favor because of having received compensation for the undertaking);
Farmers Bank of Deepwater v. Ogden, (1915) 192 Mo. App. 243, 182 S. W.
501, judgment affirmed on rehearing 192 Mo. App. 243, 188 S. W. 201
(surety company issued contract of surety insurance indemnifying the bank
against loss through its officers; the contract being construed most strongly
against the compensated surety and in favor of the party indemnified);
Lackland v. Renshaw, (1914) 256 Mo. 133, 165 S. W. 314 (surety on the
bond of a building contractor, the court holding that the rule of strictissimijuris did not apply to a bond executed for a consideration by a corporation
organized to make such bonds for a profit, and its contracts must be con-
strued most strictly in favor of the obligee); State, ex rel. Elberta Peach
and Land Co. v. Chicago Bonding and Surety Co., (1919) 279 Mo. 535, 215
S. W. 20; Dorr v. Bankers' Surety Co., (Mo. 1920) 218 S. W. 398; School
Dist. v. McClure, (Mo. 1920) 224 S. W. 831; Roark v. City Trust and
Surety Co., supra footnote 8; Long Bro's. Grocery Co. v. U. S. Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., supra footnote 7; Boppart v. Illinois Surety Co., supra foot-
note 8; Kansas City v. Davidson, supra footnote 6; State, ex rel. Matter v.
Ogden, supra footnote 8; Rule v. Anderson, (1911) 160 Mo. App. 347, 142
S. W. 358 (surety on a building contract and such contracts, conditioned
on the performance by others of contracts, were declared to be contracts of
indemnity, and, since they were prepared by the surety companies, were to
be construed strictly against the compensated surety) ; Barton v. Title Guar-
anty and Surety Co., (1915) 192 Mo. App. 561, 183 S. W. 694 (surety on
a contractor's bond; the doctrine of strictissimi juris being declared inap-
plicable where the bond was executed for hire by a corporation engaged in
the surety business for profit); Fairbanks Canning Co. v. London Guaranty
and Accident Co., (1911) 154 Mo. App. 327, 133 S. W. 664 (surety on in-
demnity bond); Schnitzer v. Couch, (Mo. 1925) 279 S. W. 165 (surety on
apartment house contractor's bond; the rule that a contract of suretyship
for the erection of a building may be strictly construed in the surety's favor
held inapplicable in case of a corporation engaged in business of acting as
surety for hire); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. American Surety Co. of N. Y.,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss2/9
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the compensated surety when ascertaining the nature and extent
of the liability assumed. It has been suggested that in both ac-
commodation and compensated suretyship, the choice of princi-
ples of construction to be applied should be determined with
reference to the person drawing the contract.25 It has been so
held in a case involving accommodation sureties where the lan-
guage was construed with a view to carrying out the intention of
the parties as expressed in the instrument executed by them.
1
supra footnote 6; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Donk, (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 113
(where directors of a corporation, who were also its sole owners, became
sureties for money borrowed and used by the corporation, they were said
to be sureties for a consideration and not entitled to the benefit of the rule
favoring voluntary sureties); School Dist. v. Aetna Accident and Liability
Co., (Mo. 1921) 234 S. W. 1017 (surety "to repay the school district all
sums of money which they may pay to other persons on account of work
and labor done or materials furnished on or for said buildings," was not
entitled to have the language of the bond construed strictly in its favor
since it was a compensated surety); Uhrich v. Globe Surety Co., (1914)
191 Mo. App. 111, 166 S. W. 845 (a bond of a compensated surety will be
given effect as a good common law bond, although it does not comply with
the requirements of the statute under which it is attempted to be made);
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Southern Surety Co., (1920) 285 Mo. 621,
226 S. W. 926 (surety on bond given to indemnify employer against lar-
ceny); N. K. Fairbanks Co. v. American Bonding Co., (1902) 97 Mo. App.
205, 70 S. W. 1096; Kansas City, to Use of Ingalls Stone Co. v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., supra footnote 4; Bagwell v. American Surety
Co., (1903) 102 Mo. App. 707, 77 S. W. 327; State, ex rel. Concrete and
Steel Const. Co. v. Southern Surety Co., supra footnote 4; St. Louis Ass'n.
v. Bonding Co., supra footnote 8; Krey Packing Co. v. U. S. Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., supra footnote 8; Kline Cloak and Suit Co. v. Morris, (1922)
293 Mo. 478, 240 S. W. 96 (surety on contractor's bond; the reason for
applying the strict rules of suretyship said to have no application in the
case of compensated sureties); Orpheum Theater and Realty Co. v. Kansas
City Casualty Co., (Mo. 1922) 239 S. W. 841 (surety on contractor's bond;
the surety having received a valuable consideration, the rule that subse-
quent changes in the contract without the surety's consent releasing the
surety was deprived the compensated surety).
Compare Kansas City, to Use of Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Southern Sur-
ety Co., (Mo. 1920) 219 S. W. 727, where the court said: "The surety com-
pany was engaged in the business of executing bonds of suretyship for a
consideration, yet its liability is not to be extended by implication beyond
the terms of the contract, but in ascertaining the meaning of the language
of its obligation, and thus determining the extent of the contract, the same
rules of construction are to be applied as are applied in the construction of
other written contracts." And see City of St. Joseph ex rel. Consolidated
Stone Co. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., (Mo. 1930) 26 S. W. (2d.) 1018, where it
was held that the compensated surety's liability is fixed by the terms of the
instrument it signs, and such undertaking cannot be varied by judicial con-
struction. Further, State, ex rel. Southern Surety Co. v. Haid, (Mo. 1932)
49 S. W. (2d.) 41, quashing cert. Texas Co. v. Wax, (1931) 226 Mo. App.
850, 36 S. W. (2d.) 122 (surety cannot be held liable beyond the terms of
his contract); Southern Real Estate and Financial Co. v. Bankers' Surety
Co., (Mo. 1916) 184 S. W. 1030.Is Arant, Suretyship, (1931) 150, 151.
1National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Nevils, (1925) 217 Mo. App. 630, 274
S. W. 503. See also Baers v. Wolf, (1893) 116 Mo. 179, 184, 22 S. W. 620,
621.
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Likewise, in the case of a compensated surety of a building con-
tractor, whose bond contained nothing to indicate that its terms
originated with the surety, it was held that the surety had a legal
right to stand equally before the law with the owner in the con-
struction of the bond.17 It seems clear, however, that in applying
the rule of strictissimi juris to accommodation sureties generally,
the Missouri courts have been influenced as much by the absence
of any pecuniary gain as by the fact that the contract was pre-
pared by some one other than surety.
The modern treatment of the compensated surety is empha-
sized by the construction placed upon statutory provisions.
Where a statute makes no distinction between gratuitous sureties
and compensated sureties, the legislative intent might very well
be deemed to give all defenses to the compensated surety that are
available to the accommodation surety, whether there has been
injury to the paid promisor or not. The use of the term surety
or guarantor without any other limitation would ordinarily in-
clude the compensated surety. It was held, however, that a sta-
tute providing for the release of surety companies from liability
on the same terms as individuals, does not entitle such surety
companies to the benefit of the rule of strictissimi juris.1s More-
over, it has been stated that in view of the public policy shown
by R.S. Mo. (1929),19 a surety which executed indemnity bonds
for profit is not entitled to a strict construction of the bonds in
its favor.2 0 The point is, that the promisor being a professional
risk taker, its contract must be construed most strictly in favor
of the obligee.21
There are at least three factual differences between the indi-
vidual and the corporate compensated surety which distinguish
and warrant a different treatment of the two distinct types.
First, the private surety becomes such purely as an accommoda-
tion for the principal debtor. The corporate compensated surety,
on the other hand, seldom becomes liable without being paid a
premium. Second, the accommodation surety generally does not
17 Southern Real Estate and Financial Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co., (Mo.
1916) 184 S. W. 1030.Is R.S. Mo. (1909, section 1209, now R.S. Mo. (1929), section 2857; Dorr
v. Bankers' Surety Co., supra footnote 7; Barton v. Title Guaranty and
Surety Co., supra footnote 8.
19 Section 2853, formerly R.S. Mo. (1909), section 1211. "Every com-
pany which shall execute any bond or other obligation, as surety for
another, under the provisions of the two preceding sections, shall be es-
topped to deny its corporate power to execute such instruments, or assume
such liability."
20 State, to Use of Hubbard and Moffitt Comm. Co. v. Cochrane, supra
footnote 7.
21 Lackland v. Renshaw, supra footnote 7; Kansas City v. Davidson,
supra footnote 6; Farmers Bank of Deepwater v. Ogden, supra footnote 14;
Dorr v. Bankers' Surety Co., supra footnote 7.
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prepare the contract which he signs. The compensated corporate
surety, however, usually subscribes to its own language, on its
own forms, as prepared by its own employees. Third, the obliga-
tion of the accommodation surety is often assumed in haste, in
reliance entirely upon the oral representations of the principal
debtor. The compensated surety never relies upon the statements
of the principal debtor but, on the contrary, investigates com-
pletely before entering into the suretyship relation; and, in addi-
tion to that, provides a staff of competent legal advisers for that
purpose.2 2 These are cogent reasons that not only account for the
recognition in Missouri of the distinction between the compen-
sated surety and the accommodation surety but justify the differ-
ence in judicial treatment. In consideration of the contrasting
motive and method of conducting its business, it is manifest that
the corporate compensated surety merits separate consideration.
Thus, in Rule v. Anderson,2 3 the court said: "The deep solici-
tude of the law for the welfare of voluntary parties who bound
themselves from purely disinterested motives never compre-
hended the protection of pecuniary enterprises organized for the
express purpose of engaging in the business of suretyship for
profit. To allow such companies to collect and retain premiums
for their services, graded according to the nature and extent of
the risk, and then to repudiate their obligations on slight pretext
that have no relation to the risk, would be most unjust and im-
moral, and would be a perversion of the rise and just rules de-
signed for the protection of voluntary sureties. The contracts of
surety companies are contracts of indemnity, and, as such, fall
under the rules of construction applicable to contracts of insur-
ance. Since they are prepared by the companies, and generally
abound with conditions and stipulations devised for the restric-
tion of the obligation assumed by the company, such limitations
providing for forfeiture of the contract, they must be strictly
construed, and no unreasonable right of forfeiture allowed." In-
surance is properly comparable with compensated suretyship in
the sense that both are businesses of a quasi-public 24 character
and, as a general rule, surety companies for hire have often been
classified with the insurance companies for purposes of legisla-
tive control because of the similiarity in their business methods.
Both do not undertake to assure persons in any instance until a
careful calculation of the risks of the business is made, and then
with such restrictions of their liability as may seem sufficient to
make it safe, and only in return for premiums sufficiently high
to make it commercially profitable. In addition to this, both the
22 See Arnold, The Compensated Surety, supra footnote 1.
23 See footnote 8, supra.
24 Stearns, Suretyship, (3rd. ed. 1922), Sections 233-243a; R.C.L. 1157-
1164.
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insurance companies as well as the corporate sureties, furnish
their own forms of contracts and ordinarily act advisedly as to
the language and the terms that are used in those contracts.2
It is apparent, then, that the compensated corporate surety and
the insurance company bear a strong resemblance to each other,
both being enterprises for their own commercial profit, and very
often governed by the same principles of law, regardless of the
practical differences between contracts of insurance and contracts
of suretyship. The consequence of this attitude toward the com-
pensated surety is that, in determining when facts subsequent
to its promise should operate as a discharge, the scope of the
risk assumed is first determined.2 6 The problem is to determinejust what facts should operate as a discharge. It is significant
that the compensated surety is entitled to the same rights of
exoneration, indemnity, subrogation and contribution as the ac-
commodation surety.27 It is in the field of suretyship defenses
that the compensated surety is frequently not discharged by facts
which would have discharged the accommodation surety, particu-
larly in such matters as extension of time, premature payments
to the principal, and alterations of construction contracts. It is
then advisable, at this point, to see how far these suretyship
defences are available to the compensated surety as recognized in
Missouri.
It is fundamental that any agreement or dealings between the
creditor and the principal in an obligation or debt, which essen-
tially varies the terms of the contract, without the consent of the
surety, will release the accommodation surety from liability.28 A
25 See 11 Tenn. L. Rev. 61.
26Arant, Suretyship, 146.
27 Stearns, Suretyship, (4th. ed.) 408.
28 Matthews v. Hill, (Mo. 1926) 287 S. W. 789 (change in the contract
between the parties without the consent of the surety of contractor was
held to release the surety, although the change did not prejudice the sur-
ety) ; Harris v. Taylor, supra footnote 12; Mallory v. Brent, (1898) 75 Mo.
App. 473 (a material change with a surety's consent in the contract en-
tered into by him releases the surety from all liability); W. T. Rawleigh
Co. v. Herzog, (Mo. 1927) 299 S. W. 1113 (a surety is discharged by mate-
rial change in the principal contract) ; Springfield Lighting Co. v. Hobart,
supra footnote 12; Kane v. Theuner, (1895) 62 Mo. App. 69 (the substitu-
tion of a different superintending architect in a building contract was held
to release the surety); Schuster v. Weiss, (1893) 114 Mo. 158, 21 S. W.
438, 19 L.R.A. 182 (any agreement between the principal parties which
varies the principal contract without the consent of the surety, will release
the surety from all liability); Highland Inv. Co. v. Kansas City Scales Co.,(1919) 277 Mo. 365, 209 S. W. 895 (any alteration of the principal contract
will release the surety); Warden v. Ryan, (1889) 37 Mo. App. 466 (the
changing of the consideration of the principal contract will release the
surety where the change was to correct a clerical mistake); Fred Heim
Brewing Co. v. Hazen, (1893) 55 Mo. App. 277 (the unauthorized addition
of the word "seal" to the signatures of a contract was held to discharge the
sureties) ; Bank of Moberly v. Meals, supra footnote 12.
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voluntary surety has the right to stand upon the strict letter of
his contract, and if any material alteration or change is, without
his knowledge and consent, made in the contract entered into by
him, or in the contract or obligation, the performance of which is
secured, he is discharged.29 The alteration may be accomplished
either by material changes in the language of the instrument, or
by material departures from its terms in its execution and en-
forcement. It is immaterial that the alteration was made without
fraudulent intent,30 or under a mistake of law. It is not neces-
sary that the alteration or change be prejudicial or beneficial
to the surety in order that he be discharged; the fact that it was
not prejudicial to him,31 will not vary the rule, it being held that
he will be discharged regardless of whether such alteration or
change was beneficial or prejudicial to him.32 But the compen-
sated surety must show injury in order to be discharged by such
alterations. 33 The alteration of, or departure from, the contract
or obligation must be prejudicialU The character of the bond
of the corporate surety is immaterial, the rule of strictissimijuris being relaxed with respect to such a surety on either a
etatutory or a common law bond. 5 Even where injury is shown,
the corporate compensated surety is only discharged pro tanto °
This does not mean, however, that the undertaking of the com-
pensated surety is to be arbitrarily construed so as to extend its
liability beyond the terms of the contract which has been made."7
The relaxation of the rule of strictissimi juris, with respect to
29 See footnote 12, supra.
30 Springfield First National Bank v. Fricke, (1881) 75 Mo. 178, 42 Am.
Rep. 397.31 Higgins v. Deering Harvester Co., (1904) 181 Mo. 360, 79 S. W. 959;
Matthews v. Hill, supra footnote 28; Leavel v. Porter, supra footnote 12.
32 Utterson v. Elmore, (1911) 154 Mo. App. 646, 136 S. W. 9 (any sub-
stantial change in a building contract, without the contractor's surety con-
sent, discharges the surety, regardless of whether the changes injure him);
Matthews v. Hill, supra footnote 28; Fred Heim Brewing Co. v. Hazen,
supra footnote 28; Warden v. Ryan, supra footnote 28:
33 Lackland v. Renshaw, supra footnote 7; Rule v. Anderson, supra foot-
note 8; State, ex rel. Hardy v. Farris, (Mo. 1932) 47 S. W. (2d.) 198(surety on bond of guardian was held liable where there was no proof in
the case that the defendant compensated surety was prejudiced or hamp-
ered in its just rights); Southern Real Estate Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co.,
(1918) 276 Mo. 18, 207 S. W. 506.
34 See footnote 33, supra.
35 School Dist. v. McClure, supra footnote 6; Uhrich v. Globe Surety Co.,
(1914) 191 Mo. App. 111, 166 S. W. 845.
30 Southern Real Estate Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co., supra footnote 33;
State, ex rel. Union Indemnity Co. v. Shain, (Mo. 1934) 66 S. W. (2d.) 102,
quashing cert. Chernus v. Kennedy-Coats Const. Co., (1934) 227 Mo. App.
582, 5b S. W. (2d.) 582.
37 A compensated surety has the right to stand on the letter of his bond,
and his obligation will not be enlarged by implication. Moore v. Title Guar-
anty Co., (1910) 151 Mo. App, 256, 131 S. W. 477; See Kirkwood ex. rel.
Blacker and P. Co. v. Byrne, (1910) 146 Mo. App. 481, 125 S. W. 810.
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compensated sureties, does not go, then, to the extent of denying
them the aid of the courts in the enforcement of their fair and
reasonable contracts, or of refusing to interpret these as other
contracts are interpreted-in accordance with the reasonable in-
tent of the parties as plainly expressed.3 8
A material alteration of a contract is said to be such a change
in the terms of the agreement as either imposes some new obliga-
tion on the party promising or takes away some obligation al-
ready imposed.3 9 Two reasons are advanced for this: First, it is
an increase of the promisor's risk. This might result in the prin-
cipal's failure to perform and render the guaranteed perform-
ance impossible. Secondly, the contract as changed is a substi-
tuted contract for which the surety has never agreed to stand
good. A conspicuous example of the departure from the absolute
rule that any alteration of the principal contract releases the
surety is to be found in the case of building contracts. The state-
ment that where changes in a building contract made without
the consent of the surety of the contractor affect the validity of
the contract, the surety is discharged, though the changes do not
increase the risk of the surety, does not apply where the surety
is one engaged in the business of suretyship for hire; and in such
cases mere immaterial variations or unsubstantial deviations,
which do not prejudice the right of the compensated surety, do
not discharge it.40 Such changes are deemed to be incidental to
any building operation and contemplated by the parties. 41
It is a common practice for the parties to a working contract
when stipulating for alterations to provide that such alterations
shall be made only on written agreement of the parties, or upon
written order of the owner's architect, or that the parties shall
agree upon the cost thereof before they shall be made. When a
material alteration is made without the observance of such for-
malities the question arises whether the sureties are discharged.
It has been held that a failure to observe such formalities will
discharge the surety. 42 In Chapman v. Eneburg,4 3 the contract
38 The liability of a compensated surety must be determined under the
ordinary rules of law with attention to the reasonable intent of the parties.
Southern Real Estate and Financial Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co., (Mo.
1916) 184 S. W. 1030; Kansas City, to Use of Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Southern Surety Co., supra footnote 14; See further State, ex. rel. Southern
Surety Co. v. Haid, (Mo. 1932) 49 S. W. (2d.) 41, quashing cert. Texas Co.
v. Wax, (1931) 36 S. W. (2d.) 122, 226 Mo. App. 850; City of St. Joseph
ex rel. Consolidated Stone Co. v. Pfeiffer Stone Co., (Mo. 1930) 26 S. W.(2d.) 1018.
39 Stearns, Suretyship, (4th. ed.) 98.
40 Bagwell v. American Surety Co., supra footnote 14; Boppart v. Illinois
Surety Co., supra footnote 8; Rule v. Anderson, supra footnote 8.
41 See footnote 40, supra.
42 Beers v. Strimple, (1893) 116 Mo. 179, 22 S. W. 620 (contract provided
that the superintendent might make alterations without invalidating it and,
in case of any difference in expense, the contract price should be changed
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permitted alterations when made by an agreement in writing.
It appeared in that case that the alterations were made pursuant
to an oral agreement. The referee concluded that the provision
in the contract was solely for the benefit of the owner of the
building and could be waived by him. On appeal the judgment
was reversed to release the accommodation surety. The court
said: "It may be conceded that the clause was to protect the
owner, but it was wholly so; and if it was, the sureties would be
entitled to whatever incidental benefits might flow to them from
its observance. The clause was, however, highly important to
the sureties, independent of the welfare of the owner ... It is
true that in agreeing to see that the contract was performed by
their principal they agreed that the sum to be paid might be
raised by extra work but only on condition that it was put down
in writing beforehand." Contrast the case of Bagwell v. SuretyCo.," where the referee found that eight changes from the origi-
nal plans and specifications for the house were made by order of
Bagwell during construction, without the knowledge of the com-
pensated surety, and without written orders from the architects
and computation of the cost by them. The court said: "That con-
tract provided that no alteration should be made except on a
written order from the architect, and that, when made, the value
of the work added to or omitted should be computed by the archi-
tects, and added to or deducted from the contract price. This
course was not pursued, and if the bond contained no more than
an obligation for faithful performance of the contract, the surety
was released when the principal parties to the contract altered it
without the knowledge or consent of the surety." The court then
cited cases supporting the proposition that if a building contract
is materially altered without consulting the surety on the con-
tractor's bond, the surety is discharged; and further that, when
the contract contains a provision for computation by the archi-
tects of the cost of the changes, this must be done before the
changes can be lawfully made. These rules were recognized as
applying to an accommodation surety but were rejected as to
the compensated surety and a construction of the compensated
surety's bond was made so as to hold that surety unconditionally
as determined by him; and that, in case of any such alteration, the expense
must be agreed on in writing before the work was done or any allowance
made therefor. It was held that the superintendent had no authority to
make alterations without consulting the sureties) ; Kane v. Thuener, (1895)
62 Mo. App. 69 (where the sureties agreed that the architect might make
deviations or alterations in the plans by additions or omissions it was held
that they were discharged by the substitution of a different architect).
43 Chapman v. Eneburg, (1902) 95 Mo. App. 128, 68 S. W. 974.4 4 Bagwell v. American Surety Co., supra footnote 14. But see Joblin v.
Illinois Surety Co., (1916) 193 Mo. App. 132, 182 S. W. 143 (no recovery
of the contractor's sureties any expenses not certified by the architect ac-
cording to the terms of the contract).
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liable within the amount specified in the bond. As in the case of
Chapman v. Eneburg it was said that where a provision re-
quired that money should be paid only on an architect's certifi-
cate as the work progressed, and on the basis of a certain per-
centage of its value, subject to additions and reductions as might
thereafter be provided, the original stipulations could not be
changed without the consent of the surety.45 But we find in
Lackland v. Renshaw,48 that the surety for a consideration, in a
bond conditioned on performance by the contractor of a building
contract, stipulating for payment in installments and final pay-
ment on the architect certifying that all of the work for which
payment was to become due had been done to his satisfaction,
was not discharged from liability because the owner made partial
payments to the contractor on account of the contract. In the
words of the court, "The surety in this case is in no position to
complain that the tenderness courts see fit to show the accommo-
dation surety, always an object of the greatest solicitude, is not
shown to it. Its situation is entirely different. It is to be dealt
with in the light of its real relation to the contract-an insurer
of its performance." It was also held that an accommodation
surety for the performance of a contract giving the owner the
right to retain the last payment to meet lienable claims was not
liable for a claim which could have thus been met, where the last
payment was made to the contractor without a certificate from
the architect that it was due as required by the contract.47 Yet
in Barton v. Surety Co.,48 it was held that where a building con-
tract provided that progress payments on the contract price were
to be made from time to time on certificates from the architect,
the final payment to be held over until after completion, the fact
that there were overpayments which impaired the reserve fund
so provided for, did not discharge the compensated surety, the
parties being bound by any overvaluation honestly made. Quot-
ing from the court: "It is clear the decision (referring to a
cited case) is grounded on the idea that the true test for the
application to the particular case of the rule of strict law is
whether or not the surety incurred the obligation as a matter
of business for profit, and where, as in the instant case, it ap-
pears that such was the nature of the relationship, the rule
45 Reissaus v. Whites, (1907) 128 Mo. App. 135, 106 S. W. 603.
46 Lackland v. Renshaw, supra footnote 7. But see Southern Real Estate
and Financial Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co., (Mo. 1916) 184 S. W. 1030(where a building contract required the owner to make payments only upon
architect's certificate based upon a computation of the value of the work
done, and payments were made upon certificates defectively made, it was
held that payments on such certificates constituted a breach of the building
contract, so that the surety would not be held liable for the payments made
on those certificates).
4T Harris v. Taylor, supra footnote 12.
49 Barton v. Title Guaranty and Surety Co., supra footnote 14.
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should not be allowed to govern whether the surety be a natural
or an artificial person."
A creditor by extending the time of payment of the debt dis-
charges a surety who does not consent to such an extension.49
The rule tends to become more formal and absolute and to be
applied without limitation, although its application to cases where
the extension of time appears to have caused little or no actual
injury to the surety has been criticized." In conformity with the
rule that a surety company can be relieved from its obligation
only where an alteration or departure from the contract is shown
to be a material variance to the prejudice and injury of the
surety for hire, it has been held that the compensated surety will
not be relieved of his contract by an extension of time to the
principal, and that there will be no presumption that such surety
was injured by the extension; such injury must be alleged and
proved.5' In such cases it is said that the surety must not only
allege and prove an extension of time by the creditor without
the consent of the surety, but must further show that he was
prejudiced thereby.5 2 A presumption of injury, under like cir-
cumstances, is indulged in favor of the accommodation surety
because of the rule that such a surety is a favorite of the law.
That rule is not applicable to a surety whose engagement is un-
dertaken for a compensation; hence no presumption of injury
found as a fact not to have incurred ought to be indulged to
49 Kincaid v. Yates, (1876) 63 Mo. 45; Thompson v. Elliott, (1838) 5
Mo. 118 (a surety on a bond is released by the granting of further time
to the principal without consent of the security, where the security has
failed to avail himself of the remedy provided by the statute by giving
written notice to the creditor to proceed against the debtor); Russell v.
Brown, (1886) 21 Mo. App. 51; Marquardt Say. Bank v. Freund, (1899)
80 Mo. App. 657; First National Bank v. Leavitt, (1877) 65 Mo. 562 (ac-
ceptance of renewals notes, each renewal note being taken as a conditional
payment of the one which preceded it, discharged the surety); Barrett v.
Davis, (1891) 104 Mo. 549, 16 S. W. 377; Stillwell v. Aaron, (1879) 69 Mo.
539, 33 Am. Rep. 517; Commercial Bank v. Wood, (1894) 56 Mo. App. 214(where the indorsee granted an extension of the time of payment a prior
indorsee was relieved of liability); Lane v. Hyder, (1912) 163 Mo. App.
688, 147 S. W. 514; State v. Johnson, (1902) 96 Mo. App. 147, 69 S. W.
1065; German Say. Ass'n. v. Helmrick, (1874) 57 Mo. 100; Johnson v.
Franklin Bank, (1903) 173 Mo. 171, 73 S. W. 191.
50 Cardozo, The Nature of The Judicial Process, 152. Arant, Suretyship,
146.
5 50 C. J. 153, par. 252; State ex rel. Hardy v. Farris, (Mo. 1932) 47
S. W. (2d.) 198 (surety on bond of guardian where it was held that the
surety being compensated must prove that it was prejudiced or hampered
in its just rights by reason of the alleged extension of time before a dis-
charge would be permitted. The surety was liable); Burton Mchg, Co. v.
National Surety Co., supra footnote 8; Lackland v. Renshaw, supra foot-
note 7; Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. John Gill and Sons Co., supra footnote 8.
52 See footnote 51, supra.
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release the surety for hire.13 In Mercantile Trust Co. v. Donk, 4
the sureties claimed discharge because time had been given to
the principal, and securety released. The court concluded that
these contentions were not supported by the facts, but suggested
that even if they were, "yet they (sureties) having received com-
pensation for becoming such, the technical rules of suretyship do
not apply, and they are liable under the more liberal rule which
is more akin to that of insurance than that of ordinary surety-
ship." An extension of time to a subcontractor, without an af-
firmative showing of resulting damage to the principal contrac-
tor, would not release the latter and his sureties from their obli-
gations on the bond.55 It has also been held that since a provision
of a building contract for the extension of time for completion
as fixed by the architects, if a claim for the extension was made
within a certain time, was for the benefit of the owner, he waived
it by himself agreeing with the contractor as to the time for ex-
tension so that such extension did not discharge the contractor's
surety.56 In the majority of instances, an extension of time does
not, in any way, prejudice the interest of the surety and, in many
cases, consent is made in advance to such an arrangement.
Very often a surety company bond contains the condition stipu-
lating the requirement that the obligee notify the surety promptly
of any act of fraud or dishonesty on the part of the principal
of the indemnity bond. Such a compensated surety may not be
relieved of all liability upon the bond by reason of the failure
of the obligee to give notice according to the terms of the bond.
The provision is undoubtedly intended to extend the common law
obligation sometimes resting upon the obligee to give notice to
the surety if he continues the principal in his employ, after he
has knowledge of acts of fraud or dishonesty which increases the
peril on the bond. A liberal construction will be made here, if
possible, in order to avoid a forfeiture of the bond and so relieve
the compensated surety. It was said in Farnirs Bank v. Ogden, 7
that although the officers of the bank had heard rumors that the
president had been sentenced to the penitentiary for larceny, and
failed to notify the surety on the president's bond of this fact,
the surety was not discharged. Quoting the court: "It may be
stated at the outset that the defendant's obligation as surety is
not so limited and circumscribed with protective requirements as
that of an ordinary surety who acts for accommodation without
gain to himself. Organized companies and corporations have now
taken up suretyship as a business which they prosecute through-
53 State ex rel. Hardy v. Farris, supra footnote 51; Burton Mchg. Co. v.
National Surety Co., supra footnote 51.
54 See footnote 14, supra.
55 Burton Mchg. Co. v. National Surety Co., supra footnote 51.
56 Boppart v. Illinois Surety Co., supra footnote 8.
5? Farmers Bank v. Ogden, supra footnote 14.
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out the country for profit, and their engagements are considered
more in the nature of guaranty insurers. These contracts are
made out by themselves, and their terms, when subject to two
meanings, are construed in favor of the party indemnified."
It is evident that in many cases contrary results are reached
by virtue of the fact that the surety is compensated. In these
instances, the decisions are couched in entirely different language
than that found in the cases involving accommodation sureties.
From the preceding discussion we find that the courts of Mis-
souri ascribe these holdings to the abnormal status of the com-
pensated surety, and yet the same results have been reached in
cases involving accommodation sureties.5 8 Ordinarily, under a
contract authorizing variations and changes from specifications,
such changes may be made without discharging the sureties.,"
It is often said, with respect to either an accommodation or a
compensated surety, that the changes must be substantial and
material if they are to operate as a discharge of the surety.0
Nevertheless the absence of the protection of the rule of strictis-
simi juris has affcted decision results both in problems of con-
struction and the operative effect of language used in the con-
tract. Accordingly, it is held, as regards the accommodation
promiser, that any substantial change in a building contract
affecting the identity of the contract without the surety's con-
sent, regardless of whether the changes injure him, will dis-
58 City of Kennett v. Katz Const. Co., (1918) 273 Mo. 279, 202 S. W. 558
(where bond of contractor provided that alterations in the work should not
violate the bond nor discharge the surety, though made without consent of
the surety, the changes in the work at the contractor's request did not
release the surety); Hax-Smith Furn. Co. v. Toll, (1908) 133 Mo. App. 404,
113 S. W. 650 (the contract of the accommodation surety authorized changes
and the surety was held not to be released on the ground that the altera-
tions were made in an unauthorized manner); Howard Co. v. Baker, (1894)
119 Mo. 397, 24 S. W. 200; Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Gates, (1901) 89 Mo.
App. 201 (while a surety has the right to stand upon the letter of his con-
tract, and any alteration thereof without his consent, even though designed
for his benefit, will discharge him, yet when the contract itself contemplates
its alteration, it may be altered without affecting the liability of the surety).59 Reissaus v. Whites, (1907) 128 Mo. App. 135, 106 S. W. 603 (where
a building contract authorizes changes from the specifications, such changes
may be made without discharging the surety on the contractor's bond);
Ashenbroedel Club v. Finley, (1893) 53 Mo. App. 256 (where a building
contract provided for such alterations as should become necessary, a devia-
tion from the original plan did not affect the validity of the contract or
release the surety). See also School Dist. v. Green, (1908) 134 Mo. App.
421, 114 S. W. 578 (where the building contract did not provide for altera-
tions, the sureties were discharged by deviations from the plans and speci-
fications made without the assent of the sureties and the owner).
6DW. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Herzog, (1927) 299 S. W. 1113; City of Kennett
v. Katz Const. Co., supra footnote 58; Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Gates, supra
footnote 58; Ashenbroedel Club v. Finley, supra footnote 59; Lackland v.
Renshaw, supra footnote 7; Boppart v. Illinois Surety Co., supra footnote 8.
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charge the surety. 1 But the courts then proceed in many cases
to add a further qualification, in the case of the compensated
surety, and require it to show injury before the change will be
permitted to relieve it.62
The fact that compensation was received by the corporate sur-
ety as the inducement for its undertaking is not of itself suffi-
cient to deprive the surety of all defenses.6 3 In many respects the
law of suretyship sustains the same attitude to this corporate
surety as to the private accommodation surety. Where the credi-
tor makes performance impossible and discharges the principal
in some way without payment or satisfaction, the compensated
surety is not liable.6 4
Furthermore, whenever a creditor has the right to apply prop-
erty of the principal debtor to the satisfaction or security of his
debt, he owes the compensated surety to duty to do so, and a
failure to perform that duty to the surety's prejudice, and with-
out its consent, discharges the surety pro tanto.6 5 A creditor
must act in good faith and with reasonable diligence to preserve
for the surety-accommodation or compensated-the liens on the
debtor's property or any security of the debtor in his hands. 6
Construction contracts often provide that payments shall be
made to the contractor at the end of stated intervals, and shall
amount to a certain percentage of the estimated value of the work
done and the materials furnished. If the owner makes a pay-
ment before the time designated or one in excess of the amount
required, the question arises whether such a payment amounts
61 Utterson v. Elmore, (1911) 154 Mo. App. 646, 136 S. W. 9; Matthews
v. Hill, (1926) 287 S. W. 789; Leavel v. Porter, (1893) 52 Mo. App. 632.
62Lackland v. Renshaw, supra footnote 7; Burton v. Mchg. Co. v. Na-
tional Surety Co., supra footnote 51.
63 Stearns, Suretyship, (4th. ed.) 408.
64 Blanke Bro. Realty Co. v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., (1923) 297
Mo. 41, 247 S. W. 797 (a lessor by forfeiting a lease for nonpayment of
rent and taxes, and thereby putting it out of the power of the lessee to
comply with the terms of the lease with respect to the erection of a building,
released the surety company); Sharon v. American Fidelity Co., (1913) 172
Mo. App. 309, 157 S. W. 972 (where within the time allowed for perform-
ance of a contract by a party thereto the adverse party makes performance
impossible, the surety on the bond of the party conditioned on performance
is not liable).
65 Kansas City, to Use of Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Southern Surety Co.,
(1920) 203 Mo. App. 148, 219 S. W. 727.
66 Lakenan v. N. Missouri Trust Co., (1910) 147 Mo. App. 48, 126 S. W.
547 (a creditor must act in good faith to preserve liens on the property
of the principal); Troll v. Dougherty & Bush Real Estate Co., (1914) 186
Mo. App. 196, 171 S. W. 665 (it is the duty of a creditor holding collateral
security to perform all acts necessary to make the security available, and
if the security is lost by the creditor's failure, a surety for the debt is dis-
charged to the extent of the loss.) ; Barton v. Title Guaranty Co., (1916)
192 Mo. App. 561, 183 S. W. 694 (surety for hire on contractor's bond is
released by owner's failure to retain part of contract price only to extent of
impairment thereof).
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to an alteration of the contract which will release the surety. The
argument in the affirmative is that not only are the sureties en-
titled to have the amounts reserved in the contract applied to the
satisfaction of possible liens or claims against the building, but
also that the fact that there are earned, but unpaid, moneys in
the hands of the owner, will act as an incentive to the contractor
to execute his contract in a faithful manner. In Taylor v. Jeter,07
it was held that sureties upon a contractor's bond had a right to
stand upon the agreement that the owner would not pay the con-
tractor during the progress of the work more than 70 percent
of the value of the work done; and, if he did pay more without
the consent of the surety, he was thereby discharged. This deci-
sion is cited with approval and followed by Evans v. Gralen.0 8
And to the same effect is Watkins v. Pierce.0 9 This rule has been
retained but modified when applied to compensated sureties.
Overpayments to the contractor, or failure to retain a certain
percentage of the contract price until completion of the work,
are treated as being in the nature of releasing security taken by
the contractor, which releases the surety only pro tanto, and
prejudice or damage done is measured by the value of the secur-
ity released.70
The results of the Missouri cases show that the courts take
cognizance of the compensated surety's function in present day
business transactions. To discharge the compensated surety un-
der the same circumstances as are found to discharge the accom-
modation surety would seem to be unfair when one considers the
extreme leniency of the law of suretyship toward the gratuitous
promisor. If the creditor's conduct accords substantially with
what is ordinary reasonable business prudence, the compensated
surety should be held liable, gince those business standards are
contemplated by the surety in assuming the risk.
J. CHARLES CRAWLEY '35.
67 Taylor v. Jeter, (1856) 23 Mo. 244.68 Evans v. Graden, (1894) 125 Mo. 72, 28 S. W. 439.6D Watkins v. Pierce, (1881) 10 Mo. App. 595. See also Tinsley v. Kem-
ery, (1905) 111 Mo. App. 87, 84 S. W. 993.
70 State, ex rel. Union Indemnity Co. v. Sham, (Mo. 1934) 66 S. W. (2d.)
102, quashing cert. Chernus v. Kennedy-Coats Const. Co., (1934) 227 Mo.
App. 582, 55 S. W. (2d.) 582; Barton v. Title Guaranty and Surety Co.,
supra footnote 14; Southern Real Estate and Financial Co. v. Bankers'
Surety Co., (1916) 184 S. W. 1930.
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